Wednesday, August 22, 2012

Torn Shreds... Heraclitus on G/god


A Torn Shred from Heraclitus… “To the G/god all things are beautiful, good, and right [suitable]; men, on the other hand, have supposed that, while some things are unsuitable [wrong], others are suitable [right].”

This passage has the following reference [If you wish to, but cannot read the Greek Font, you may download the font from the internet onto your computer.]: B. 2, 1.1.102.1; PORPHYR. zu D 4 [I 69, 6 Schr.] tw◊i me«n qew◊i kala» 2 pa¿nta kai« aÓgaqa» kai« di÷kaia, a‡nqrwpoi de« a± me«n 3 a‡dika uJpeilh/fasin a± de« di÷kaia. 
·      Grammatical Comments: this is the perfect form of the verb of hypolambano (uJpeilh/fasin), commonly meaning to suppose, assume, to have as a working hypothesis

In Heraclitus’ view, it would seem that men and the G/god/gods have very little in common. They are, quite literally, worlds apart. The Divine Gaze sees everything at a glance, and grasps all things within the weft of a streaming together-ness; the Divine Gaze sees in “things” (from mosquitos and flies to ideas and imaginings) no quality other than the fact that they are. And by virtue of their being, which means being what they are, all “things” are beautiful, good, and right.
            Men, however, do not have the Big Gaze that sees everything at a glance; from countless and always-partial ‘points of view’ they only catch a glimpse of fragments of things. Furthermore, in addition to our Fragmented (and therefore incomplete and finally uninformed) Gaze, Heraclitus also says that the Human Gaze is further degraded by preconceived ideas and notions, which are moral in nature, and which we seem to ascribe naturally to ‘things’ that enter into our field of view.

From this Heraclitan shred it is clear that the G/god is not moral in the way that men are moral, because to the G/god nothing is a‡dika, or unsuitable. The term ‘unsuitable’ is commonly understood in Ancient Greece to connote a violation of law (compare Xenophanes, Herodotus, Aristotle, Plutarch). This would mean, therefore, that there is no-thing grasped in the Divine Gaze that is a violation of law; so either the G/god is a-moral, or It conceives of no Law in its Gazing, and therefore also knows no justice. These are probably all correct conclusions, because each is consistent with the civilization that gave us Epic Poetry and Greek Tragedy.
            If, though, this is a theoretically correct way to envision the G/god, then how can the Religious Man justify reasoning or acting morally, which is to say in direct contradiction to the G/god he worships? What argument can the Religious Man make, and based on what possible anchor of reason or ‘point’ of theology, that would allow him to condemn morally anything at all? This is the question that is at the heart of Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue, and for which Socrates finds neither reason no response. This Religious Attitude is the world become Irrational, and leaves Socrates, at last, speechless with wonder.
            On the other hand, however, although nothing may be a‡dika (unsuitable) to Heraclitus’ G/god, should men, with their moralizing ways, actually attempt to imitate the G/god? Should we try to exclude from our thinking about the world the framing of ‘things’ morally, in terms of suitable/unsuitable, legal/illegal, good/bad, etc.?
            Finally, what if there really is no moral ‘bottom’ to the world, where moral thought can be truthfully and finally grounded? What if, should we ephemeral creatures be moved to imitate the gods, we were to leave behind moral framing and begin to see that all the things of the world are in fact beautiful, and good, and right. What would happen in and to the world if we were to construct a human ethic based on the Beautiful, the Good, and the Right? What if, seeing all things as a ‘right-ness’, as di÷kaia, we were to incorporate only the Beautiful and the Good (kala» and« aÓgaqa») in our understanding and interpretations of the world?

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